At the end of January, Richard McLean, Daijiro Okada and myself are organizing a workshop on Bounded Rationality at Rutgers. Bounded rationality looks at game theory questions like equilibria with computationally-bounded participants.
Immediately following the Bounded Rationality workshop is the workshop on Markets as Predictive Devices (Information Markets). The organizers Robin Hanson, John Ledyard and David Pennock have created a program with a set of speakers that spread the range from theory to practice in markets designed to estimate the probability of future events. The program ends with a panel discussion on the Policy Analysis Markets that came under fire a year and a half ago for its "terror futures".
In mid-April, Rakesh Vohra and I are organizing a workshop on Large-Scale Games to be held at Northwestern. This workshop will examine questions in game theory that deal with issues in large scenarios like the internet with many players, incomplete information, lack of common knowledge, asynchrony and related problems.